

MIND UPLOADING: IS THE COPY PROBLEM A CATEGORY ERROR?

SPARK BRAIN PRESERVATION SUMMIT 2026

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
REVIVAL VIA WHOLE BRAIN EMULATION

SOME METHODS OF BRAIN PRESERVATION DO NOT READILY LEND THEMSELVES TO BIOLOGICAL REVIVAL...

BUT RATHER REVIVAL VIA WHOLE BRAIN EMULATION (WBE).

ON A FUNCTIONALIST/CONNECTIONIST PHILOSOPHY OF MIND, WBE IS PERFECTLY SOUND.

HOWEVER, SOME PEOPLE FEAR SUCH AN UPLOAD WOULD NOT BE THE SAME PERSON WHO ENTERED THE PROCEDURE, BUT RATHER A "COPY".



THE COPY PROBLEM

THE CONCERN THAT IN A MIND UPLOADING SCENARIO, ONE OR MORE OF THE RESULTING PEOPLE AREN'T THE SAME PERSON WHO ENTERED THE PROCESS, BUT RATHER ARE A NEWLY EMERGED "PERSON COPY".



MY PAST WRITING ON THE COPY PROBLEM

ARTICLE: NONDESTRUCTIVE MIND UPLOADING AND THE STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 2023.

ARTICLE & SLIDES: THE STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND PERSONAL IDENTITY. 2019/2020.

VIDEO: WHY A WHOLE BRAIN PRESERVATION FROM YOUR PRESERVED BRAIN IS PROBABLY YOU. 2018.

ARTICLE, WITH RANDAL KOENE: THE FALLACY OF FAVORING GRADUAL REPLACEMENT MIND UPLOADING OVER SCAN-AND-COPY. *JOURNAL OF CONSCIOUSNESS STUDIES (JoCS)*, 2016.


BOOK: A TAXONOMY AND METAPHYSICS OF MIND-UPLOADING. 2014.

ARTICLE: RESPONSE TO SUSAN SCHNEIDER'S THE PHILOSOPHY OF 'HER'. 2014.

I'VE APPROACHED THE COPY PROBLEM FROM SEVERAL DIRECTIONS ALREADY.
THIS TALK PRESENTS A NEW IDEA ON THE TOPIC.

THE COPY PROBLEM: DESTRUCTIVE SCENARIOS


IN A DESTRUCTIVE SCENARIO, THE CONCERN IS THAT THE "ORIGINAL" PERSON HASN'T BEEN PRESERVED BY THE UPLOAD, AND HAS THEREFORE VANISHED (AND PERISHED).



THE "ORIGINAL" PERSON IS CLAIMED TO HAVE DIED SOMEWHERE HERE, HOPEFULLY PRIOR TO SLICING, IF THERE IS ANY MERCY.

THE COPY PROBLEM: NONDESTRUCTIVE SCENARIOS

IN A NONDESTRUCTIVE SCENARIO, THE CONCERN IS THAT THE "ORIGINAL" PERSON HASN'T "TRANSFERRED" TO THE UPLOAD, AND REMAINS STUCK WHERE THEY BEGAN.



ANCESTORS AND DESCENDANTS

WE CAN'T USE TERMS LIKE "ORIGINAL" AND "COPY" DURING ANALYSIS.

THEY UNDERMINE OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS BY IMPOSING BIASES (AND EFFECTIVELY PRESUPPOSING THE CONCLUSION*) BEFORE WE EVEN BEGIN.

I PREFER THE TERMINOLOGY OF AN

ANCESTOR

AND ONE OR MORE

DESCENDANT

DESCENDANT

DESCENDANT

THE QUESTION IS WHICH DESCENDANTS CAN
CLAIM IDENTITY PRIMACY TO THE ANCESTOR.

*THE BEGGING THE QUESTION, OR ASSUMING THE CONCLUSION, LOGICAL FALLACY.

ANCESTORS AND DESCENDANTS

TERMS LIKE "ORIGINAL" AND "COPY" UNDERMINE OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS BY IMPOSING BIASES (AND EFFECTIVELY PRESUPPOSING THE CONCLUSION*) BEFORE WE EVEN BEGIN.



I PREFER THE TERMINOLOGY OF AN ANCESTOR AND ONE OR MORE DESCENDANTS. THE QUESTION IS WHICH DESCENDANTS CAN CLAIM IDENTITY PRIMACY TO THE ANCESTOR.

* THE BEGGING THE QUESTION, OR ASSUMING THE CONCLUSION, LOGICAL FALLACY.

MODELS OF PERSONAL IDENTITY

MOST MODELS OF PERSONAL IDENTITY ARE UNDERPINNED BY A CORRESPONDING **CONTINUITY CONCEPT**:

IDENTITY MODEL	CONTINUITY CONCEPT
BODY	MATERIAL OR COMPONENT
4D SPACETIME WORM	SMOOTH SPACETIME MOVEMENT
CLOSEST CONTINUER	SIMILARITY
PHYSICAL CAUSALITY	PHYSICAL/CHEMICAL/METABOLIC/NEURAL-PROCESSING
FUNCTIONAL OR BEHAVIORAL	INFORMATION-PROCESSING FUNCTION
PATTERN	PATTERN OR INFORMATION DESCRIPTION
STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS	PHENOMENOLOGY
PSYCHOLOGICAL	MEMORY


THE COPY PROBLEM ARISES WHEN AN ***UPLOADING SCENARIO***, COUPLED WITH A PARTICULAR ***IDENTITY MODEL***, BREAKS THE CORRESPONDING ***CONTINUITY***, THEREBY IMPLICATING A ***FAILURE TO PRESERVE IDENTITY***.

PERSONAL VS. NUMERICAL IDENTITY

TWO FOUNDATIONAL THEORIES OF METAPHYSICAL PERSONAL IDENTITY ARE BODY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IDENTITY. BOTH SHARE A SIMILAR PROBLEM:

IF IDENTITY IS INTERPRETED IN RIGID TERMS OF *NUMERACY*, THAT DOESN'T PERMIT OBVIOUS DIACHRONIC CHANGES ACROSS WHICH IDENTITY IS READILY ACKNOWLEDGED TO PRESERVE.

THE BODY CONTINUALLY
WASHES OUT OLD, AND
BRINGS IN NEW, ATOMS.



THE MIND CONTINUALLY
SHEDS OLD, AND GAINS
NEW, MEMORIES*.



HOW CAN IDENTITY PERSIST ACROSS SUCH *NUMERACY VIOLATIONS*?


*THOMAS REID, THE BRAVE OFFICER (1785).

THE SHIP OF THESEUS AND DEREK PARFIT'S RELATION 'R'*

PRESERVING IDENTITY WHILE TOLERATING DIACHRONIC CHANGE IS ADDRESSED THE SAME WAY BY BOTH MODELS: "SUFFICIENTLY SMALL" CHANGES WITHIN EACH MODEL'S CRITERIA.

UNDER BODY IDENTITY, A PERSON PERSISTS ACROSS "SLOW" MATERIAL CHANGEOVER, I.E., THE SHIP OF THESEUS.

UNDER PSYCHOLOGICAL IDENTITY, A PERSON PERSISTS ACROSS "SLOW" MEMORY CHANGEOVER, I.E., DEREK PARFIT'S RELATION 'R' OR THOMAS REID'S BRAVE OFFICER†.



*PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984).


†THOMAS REID (1785).

BRANCHING IDENTITY

ANY MODEL OF PERSONAL IDENTITY BY WHICH MULTIPLE DESCENDANTS MIGHT IDENTIFY WITH A COMMON ANCESTOR.

OR AS PHRASED IN MY 2018 TALK*:

**"ALL DESCENDANT MINDS OF A COMMON
ANCESTRAL MIND HAVE EQUAL PRIMACY
IN THEIR CLAIM TO THE ORIGINAL IDENTITY."**




*KEITH WILEY, WHY A WHOLE BRAIN EMULATION FROM YOUR PRESERVED BRAIN IS PROBABLY YOU. CARBONCOPIES WORKSHOP: FROM BRAIN PRESERVATION TO MIND UPLOADING. (2018).

BRANCHING IDENTITY: THE ANCESTOR'S CONUNDRUM

BUT BRANCHING IDENTITY PRESENTS A CONUNDRUM. EVEN IF ALL DESCENDANTS ARE GRANTED IDENTITY PRIMACY TO THE ANCESTOR...

...WHICH DESCENDANT DID THE SINGULAR ANCESTOR BECOME?!




THE WHOLE POINT OF BRANCHING IDENTITY IS TO NOT CONCERN ONESELF WITH THIS SORT OF QUESTION—BUT THAT CAN BE A DIFFICULT FRAME OF MIND TO ADOPT.

BRANCHING IDENTITY: THE ANCESTOR'S CONUNDRUM

MY SOLUTION TO THE **ANCESTOR'S CONUNDRUM** IS THAT PERSONAL IDENTITY IS ACTUALLY A ONE-DIRECTIONAL RELATION, BACKWARD IN TIME*. YOU CAN IDENTIFY WITH AN ANCESTOR, BUT NOT WITH A DESCENDANT:

- IT'S VALID TO ASK WHO, FROM THE PAST, YOU IDENTIFY AS.
- BUT IT'S **INVALID** TO ASK WHO, IN THE FUTURE, YOU IDENTIFY AS.



BUT **NUMERICAL** IDENTITY IS **SYMMETRIC**. IF $A=B$, THEN $B=A$.
HOW CAN THIS WORK?

*ANALOGICALLY, ALL CATS ARE MAMMALS BUT NOT ALL MAMMALS ARE CATS. SIMILAR METAPHORS ABOUND.

BRANCHING IDENTITY: DEFENSE OF THE ONE-DIRECTIONAL RELATION

THE PAST CONCRETELY EXISTS WHILE THE FUTURE IS ALMOST INFINITELY UNDETERMINED. THERE IS PRECISELY ONE PAST AND ONE ANCESTOR WHO ALREADY DEFINITELY EXISTED. PEOPLE “IN THE FUTURE” DON’T EXIST IN THAT WAY AT ALL, AND ARE NOT AVAILABLE FOR SUCH CONSIDERATIONS.



ALICE STILL EXISTS AT TIME ‘B’ (AS PART OF B’S CONCRETE PAST), SO WE CAN FORM SOLID STATEMENTS AND JUDGMENTS ABOUT HER AT TIME ‘B’.

NONE OF THESE PEOPLE EXIST AT TIME ‘A’, CERTAINLY NOT IN THE WAY ALICE’S PAST SELF STILL EXISTS AT TIME ‘B’. THESE ARE ONLY POTENTIAL PEOPLE AT TIME ‘A’. OUR SPECULATIONS ABOUT THEM ARE WEAK AT BEST.



BRANCHING VS. NUMERICAL IDENTITY

PERSONAL IDENTITY ALSO FAILS DESCENDANT-DESCENDANT IDENTITY, OR *TRANSITIVITY*, I.E., IF MULTIPLE DESCENDANTS CAN IDENTIFY WITH THE ANCESTOR, THEY REMAIN DISTINCT BETWEEN ONE ANOTHER.

WE ALREADY SAW HOW IT FAILS DIACHRONIC CHANGE, OR *NUMERACY*.



AND HOW IT FAILS THE ARROW OF TIME, OR *SYMMETRY*.



PERHAPS WE SHOULD FACE FACTS:
**PERSONAL IDENTITY SIMPLY ISN'T THE
SAME THING AS NUMERICAL IDENTITY***
(AND WE SHOULD STOP SUBJECTING IT TO
THE SAME EXPECTATIONS OR RESTRICTIONS).

*THIS WAS SORT OF PARFIT'S POINT, BUT HIS PHRASING WAS TO ABANDON THE CONCEPT OF PERSONAL IDENTITY IN FAVOR OF RELATION 'R', NOT MERELY GRANT THE TERM "IDENTITY" DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS IN DIFFERENT CONTEXTS.

BRANCHING BODY IDENTITY

SOME MODELS OF IDENTITY ARE DIFFICULT TO BRANCH, SUCH AS BODY IDENTITY. A GIVEN ANCESTRAL ATOM CAN GO TO AT MOST ONE DESCENDANT. THAT ATOM CANNOT BRANCH.




DEVISING A BRANCHING BODY MODEL INVOLVES ADDITIONAL CRITERIA, SUCH TOLERATING SOME "SUFFICIENT SUBSET" OF THE ATOMIC SUITE. IF "SUFFICIENT" $> 50\%$, THEN BRANCHING IS IMPOSSIBLE. IF "SUFFICIENT" IS $\leq 50\%$ THEN BRANCHING IS POSSIBLE.


SUCH ADDENDUMS TO THE MODEL FEEL AD-HOC.

BRANCHING PSYCHOLOGICAL IDENTITY

NONPHYSICAL CONCEPTS, LIKE MENTAL TRAITS, CAN BRANCH MUCH MORE EASILY THAN PHYSICAL CONCEPTS, LIKE ATOMS.



**DOING SO IS AKIN TO PLATONIC REALISM,
IN WHICH ABSTRACT TYPES CAN BE MULTI-
INSTANTIATED BY MULTIPLE PHYSICAL TOKENS*.**



*KEITH WILEY, A TAXONOMY AND METAPHYSICS OF MIND-UPLOADING (2014).

BRANCHING PSYCHOLOGICAL IDENTITY

PSYCHOLOGICAL IDENTITY SEEMINGLY FACILITATES IDENTITY BRANCHING. TWO DESCENDANTS COULD EASILY HAVE MEMORIES THAT IMPLY EACH IDENTIFIES WITH THE SAME ANCESTOR.



OTHER NONPHYSICAL MODELS ALSO READILY FACILITATE BRANCHING:

- **STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS IDENTITY**
- **FUNCTIONAL OR BEHAVIORAL PROCESS IDENTITY**
- **PATTERN IDENTITY**


CATEGORY ERRORS*

AN ERROR IN REASONING THAT ARISES WHEN A QUESTION PRESUMES THAT A CONCEPT BELONGS TO A CATEGORY WHOSE PROPERTIES DON'T APPLY TO THE CONCEPT TO BEGIN WITH.

FOR EXAMPLE, ASKING THE COLOR OF THE SEVENTH FACE OF A CUBE IS A CATEGORY ERROR†.

THE QUESTION ERRONEOUSLY ASSIGNS CUBES TO THE CATEGORY OF OBJECTS WITH SEVEN OR MORE SIDES, AND THEN INQUIRES ON THAT INCORRECT PRESUMPTION.

CONSEQUENTLY, THE QUESTION IS NULL AND VOID OUT OF THE GATE.




*GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND (1949).

†SPARE ME A NERDY RETORT ABOUT HYPERCUBES.

CATEGORY ERRORS

CATEGORY ERRORS ARE CONSIDERED AMONG THE WORST MISTAKES ONE CAN MAKE WHEN ATTEMPTING RATIONAL REASONING.

THEY ARE SO EMBARRASSINGLY BAD THAT THEY'RE OFTEN DESCRIBED AS **"NOT EVEN WRONG"**.



ORIGINALITY VS. COPYISM REQUIRES A RELEVANT DIFFERENCE

ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS ASIDE, THE FOLLOWING **MUST** BE TRUE FOR AN ORIGINAL/COPY DISTINCTION TO APPLY BETWEEN DESCENDANTS:

THERE MUST BE A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM.

AFTER ALL, IT IS THIS DIFFERENCE UPON WHICH AN ORIGINAL/COPY DISTINCTION HANGS.


AND NOTABLY, THE DIFFERENCE MUST OCCUR WITHIN THE IDENTITY MODEL BEING APPLIED. POINTING TO SOME DIFFERENCE IN ANOTHER MODEL JUST TO **FIND** A DIFFERENCE TO JUSTIFY "COPYISM" IS SIMPLY SPECIAL PLEADING, GOALPOST-MOVING, OR MOTIVATED REASONING (TAKE YOUR PICK)*.

*IN A BROADER OVERVIEW OF THE TOPIC, THERE MAY BE VALUE IN A PLURALISTIC IDENTITY MODEL THAT COMBINES ASPECTS OF MULTIPLE MODELS INTO AN OVERARCHING MODEL OF IDENTITY, BUT WE SHOULD STILL ANALYZE EACH MODEL'S MERITS IN ISOLATION BEFORE COHERING SOME GRAND FINALE OF METAPHYSICAL PERSONAL IDENTITY.

ORIGINALITY VS. COPYISM REQUIRES A RELEVANT DIFFERENCE

THIS DIFFERENCE QUESTION APPLIES TO THE IMMEDIATELY BRANCHED, BUT NOT YET DIVERGED, STATES (WITHIN THE MODEL) OF THE DESCENDANTS.

DIFFERENCES THAT ACCUMULATE BY "LIVED DIVERGENCE", AS OPPOSED TO RESULTING FROM THE UPLOADING PROCESS, ARE IRRELEVANT TO IDENTITY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THEY APPLY **BETWEEN THE DESCENDANTS**, NOT BETWEEN EACH **DESCENDANT AND THE ANCESTOR**.



ORIGINALITY VS. COPYISM REQUIRES A RELEVANT DIFFERENCE

THE QUESTION FOR EACH MODEL IS WHETHER ANY POST-UPLOAD DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DESCENDANTS AND THE ANCESTOR CAN OCCUR WITHIN THE MODEL'S CRITERIA.

THIS MAY NOT BE TRUE OF ALL CONTINUITY CONCEPTS AND MODELS OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.

IDENTITY MODEL A:
CAN DIFFERENCES OCCUR?

IDENTITY MODEL B:
CAN DIFFERENCES OCCUR?

IDENTITY MODEL C:
CAN DIFFERENCES OCCUR?

IDENTITY MODEL D:
CAN DIFFERENCES OCCUR?

IDENTITY MODEL E:
CAN DIFFERENCES OCCUR?

IDENTITY MODEL F:
CAN DIFFERENCES OCCUR?

IDENTITY MODEL G:
CAN DIFFERENCES OCCUR?

IDENTITY MODEL H:
CAN DIFFERENCES OCCUR?

PERSONAL IDENTITY MODEL DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY

WHICH IDENTITY MODELS ARE CANDIDATES FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DESCENDANTS W.R.T. THE ANCESTOR IMMEDIATELY POST-PROCEDURE?

IDENTITY MODEL	DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY
BODY	YES OR NO?
4D SPACETIME WORM	YES OR NO?
CLOSEST CONTINUER	YES OR NO?
PHYSICAL CAUSALITY	YES OR NO?
FUNCTIONAL OR BEHAVIORAL	YES OR NO?
PATTERN	YES OR NO?
STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS	YES OR NO?
PSYCHOLOGICAL	YES OR NO?

BODY IDENTITY DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY

DESCENDANTS ALREADY HAVE DIFFERENT SUITES OF ATOMS AT THE MOMENT OF BRANCHING.
THEY DIFFER **BEFORE** DIVERGING.



DESCENDANTS ALSO RESIDE IN DIFFERENT LOCATIONS, A PROPERTY OF MATTER & BODY,
PERHAPS OF VARYING PRIORITY, E.G., SPATIAL PROXIMITY TO THE ANCESTOR*.

SINCE THESE DIFFERENCES DON'T RELY ON DIACHRONIC DIVERGENCE, BUT RATHER OCCUR
IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING—AND DUE TO—THE UPLOADING PROCESS, THEY MIGHT AFFECT
IDENTITY JUDGMENT.

CONCLUSION: YES, BODY IDENTITY BELONGS TO THE DIFFERENCES-OCCUR CATEGORY.

*IN A NONDESTRUCTIVE SCENARIO, ONE DESCENDANT WILL CONTAIN THE SAME ATOMS AS, AND BE SPATIALLY COINCIDENT WITH, THE ANCESTOR. DOES THIS MATTER?

PERSONAL IDENTITY MODEL DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY

IN THE INTERESTS OF TIME, I WILL SKIP OVER A PRESENTATION OF MOST OF THE IDENTITY MODELS' DIFFERENCE CANDIDACIES.

- **BODY**
- ~~4D SPACETIME WORM~~
- ~~CLOSEST CONTINUER~~
- ~~PHYSICAL CAUSALITY~~
- ~~FUNCTIONAL OR BEHAVIORAL~~
- ~~PATTERN~~
- ~~STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS~~
- **PSYCHOLOGICAL**

THE FULL SLIDES FOR THIS TALK INCLUDE A COMPLETE EXPLORATION.

4D SPACETIME WORM IDENTITY* DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY

MANY NONDESTRUCTIVE UPLOADING SCENARIOS OPERATE SUCH THAT ONE DESCENDANT FOLLOWS A SMOOTH 4D SPACETIME WORM W.R.T. THE ANCESTOR (OFTEN TERMED THE "ORIGINAL") WHILE OTHER DESCENDANTS DO NOT.

ALTHOUGH OFTEN PRESENTED AGAINST PATTERN-TRANSMISSION-AND-REPLICATION SCENARIOS (TELEPORTATION), EVEN DESTRUCTIVE SLICE-AND-SCAN UPLOADING MAY SEEMINGLY FAIL THIS IDENTITY MODEL'S CRITERIA.

CONCLUSION: YES, DIFFERENCES CAN OCCUR. IT BELONGS TO THE DIFFERENCES-OCCUR CATEGORY. HOWEVER...

*THEODORE SIDER, FOUR-DIMENSIONALISM: AN ONTOLOGY OF PERSISTENCE AND TIME (2001).
ALSO SEE VARIOUS WRITINGS BY SUSAN SCHNEIDER.

4D SPACETIME WORM IDENTITY DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY

4D SPACETIME WORM IDENTITY COULD PROCEED BY “FISSIONING” ONE PERSON INTO TWO HALVES, AND THEN REPLICATING AND EMULATING THE MISSING HALVES (WHICH IS SOME OTHER MODEL: PATTERN, FUNCTION, ETC.).

CONCEPTUALLY, THE DESCENDANTS FOLLOW EQUALLY CONTINUOUS (OR EQUALLY HALF-CONTINUOUS) 4D SPACETIME WORMS W.R.T. THE ANCESTOR.

THIS ISN'T A BODY IDENTITY THEORY OF ATOM SUITE. IT PERTAINS TO A PERSON'S BODY'S SPATIOTEMPORAL CONTINUITY. SINCE AMPUTEES SURVIVE THEIR ORDEALS WITH INTACT IDENTITIES, LOSING SOME OF ONE'S BODY IS PROVABLY NOT PROBLEMATIC FOR THIS IDENTITY MODEL. SO, IS LOSING 50% ACCEPTABLE, OR DOES THAT ERADICATE IDENTITY?

CONCLUSION: NO, THIS MODEL **MIGHT NOT** FALL INTO THE DIFFERENCES-OCCUR CATEGORY IF THE UPLOADING PROCESS OPERATES BY PERFECT FISSION, BUT IN NON-IDIOSYNCRATIC CASES, YES, THIS MODEL GENERALLY QUALIFIES FOR APPLICABLE DIFFERENCES.

CLOSEST CONTINUER IDENTITY* DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY

THE WHOLE POINT OF CLOSEST CONTINUER IDENTITY IS TO GRANT THE "MORE SIMILAR" DESCENDANT THE ANCESTRAL IDENTITY. SO PRETTY MUCH BY DEFINITION, THIS MUST FALL INTO THE DIFFERENCES-OCCUR CATEGORY SINCE BEING "MORE SIMILAR" IS A FORM OF DIFFERENCE.


THIS CONCLUSION MIGHT BE CONFOUNDED IF THERE IS NO "GREATER SIMILARITY" TO LATCH ONTO, SUCH AS IN THE FISSION SCENARIO. BUT IF THERE IS NO CLOSEST CONTINUER, THEN PERHAPS THIS ENTIRE MODEL SIMPLY CAN'T BE APPLIED TO DETERMINE IDENTITY IN THAT SCENARIO.

CONCLUSION: YES, THIS MODEL FEELS RIGHT FOR THE DIFFERENCES-OCCUR CATEGORY—SO LONG AS THE MODEL APPLIES IN THE FIRST PLACE.

*ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS (1981)

PHYSICAL CAUSALITY IDENTITY* DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY

DONALD DAVIDSON DISCUSSES THIS IDENTITY MODEL VIA HIS SWAMPMAN THOUGHT EXPERIMENT*.



FOR A CONTINUOUS, CONSCIOUS, ONLINE UPLOADING PROCESS, IN WHICH THE DESCENDANTS' CAUSAL PROCESSES' DIRECTLY PHYSICALLY FOLLOW FROM THE ANCESTOR[†], THEY DON'T NECESSARILY "DIFFER" IN THEIR CAUSAL RELATION TO THE ANCESTOR.

CONCLUSION: NO, THIS IDENTITY MODEL DOES NOT BELONG TO THE DIFFERENCES-OCCUR CATEGORY.

*DONALD DAVIDSON, "KNOWING ONE'S OWN MIND" (1987).

[†] DAVIDSON'S SWAMPMAN SCENARIO SOMETIMES INVOLVES A SECOND, UNRELATED LIGHTNING STRIKE TO CREATE THE SWAMPMAN, AND THEREFORE DOESN'T NECESSARILY ADHERE TO PHYSICAL CAUSALITY AS DESCRIBED HERE, BUT MANY MIND UPLOADING THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS AND SCENARIOS INVOLVE MORE CAUSAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

PHYSICAL CAUSALITY IDENTITY DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY

QUESTION: DOES STASIS DURING THE UPLOADING PROCESS—OR EVEN JUST OF AN INDIVIDUAL UNDER NONUPLOADING CIRCUMSTANCES—BREAK PHYSICAL CAUSALITY CONTINUITY (PCC)?

IF SO, AND IF PCC IS CRUCIAL FOR IDENTITY PRESERVATION, THEN REAL-LIFE STASIS SCENARIOS* DEMONSTRATE REAL-WORLD IDENTITY OBLITERATION AND INVOCATION STORIES. THAT'S RIDICULOUS. SO EITHER STASIS DOESN'T BREAK PCC OR PCC IS A PROVEN FAILED IDENTITY MODEL.

I WOULD ARGUE THAT STASIS PRESERVES PHYSICAL CAUSALITY BUT BREAKS CONTINUITY. OTHERWISE CAUSALITY AND CONTINUITY BECOME INTERMINGLED CONCEPTS. I PREFER TO CONSIDER THEM ORTHOGONAL, SUCH THAT A PHYSICAL PROCESS (E.G., MOLECULAR INTERACTIONS) CAN BE:

- CAUSAL AND CONTINUOUS (EVERYDAY LIFE)
- CAUSAL BUT DISCONTINUOUS (STASIS AND RESUMPTION)
- ACAUSAL BUT CONTINUOUS (PATTERN REPLICATION & RESUMPTION)
- NEITHER (STASIS WITH PATTERN REPLICATION & RESUMPTION)

*RAPID FRIGID DROWNING AND MEDICALLY INDUCED HYPOTHERMIA (AKA DEEP HYPOTHERMIC CIRCULATORY ARREST).

PHYSICAL CAUSALITY IDENTITY DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY

QUESTION: DOES INITIATING THE UPLOAD'S PHYSICAL CAUSAL STREAM FROM THE ANCESTOR'S RECONSTRUCTED BRAIN SCAN CAUSALLY ROOT THAT DESCENDANT TO THE ANCESTOR? IT'S DISCONTINUOUS (IN AN OFFLINE UPLOADING PROCESS), BUT IS IT PHYSICALLY ACAUSAL?

SINCE THIS INITIATION INVOLVES A "PATTERN IDENTITY" STEP, IT FEELS LIKE GOALPOST-MOVING. WE SHOULD AVOID MIXING MODELS, ESPECIALLY TO PATCH PROBLEMS AD-HOC AS THEY ARISE WITH THE FIRST MODEL, IN THIS CASE PHYSICAL CAUSALITY. I WOULD CALL THIS INITIATION BOTH DISCONTINUOUS AND ACAUSAL W.R.T. THE ANCESTOR.

CONCLUSION: NO, THIS IDENTITY MODEL STILL DOESN'T BELONG TO THE DIFFERENCES-OCCUR CATEGORY.

DISCONTINUOUS PHYSICAL CAUSALITY IDENTITY DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY

DISCONTINUOUS PHYSICAL CAUSALITY IS IMPLICITLY SOME OTHER CONTINUITY MODEL: PATTERN, FUNCTION, 4D SPACETIME WORM, PSYCHOLOGICAL, ETC.

CAN DISCONTINUOUS PHYSICAL PROCESS IDENTITY BE ASSIGNED TO THE CATEGORY OF MODELS FOR WHICH DIFFERENCES OCCUR?

E.G., NONDESTRUCTIVE SCAN UNDER STASIS, FOLLOWED BY REVIVAL OF ONE AND EMULATION OF THE OTHER (OR OTHERS).

THE ANCESTOR'S METABOLIC AND SPIKE-GENERATING/PROPAGATING BIOLOGICAL ACTIVITY IS MORE PHYSICALLY MAINTAINED BY ONE DESCENDANT BRAIN (THE COLLOQUIAL "ORIGINAL PERSON") THAN ANOTHER (THE COLLOQUIAL "UPLOAD", WHO MAY, OF COURSE, NOT EVEN BE BIOLOGICAL). ANOTHER SET OF PHYSICALLY CAUSAL PROCESSES WILL BE INITIATED IN THAT DESCENDANT, BUT THOSE ARE A DIFFERENT SET OF PHYSICAL PROCESSES WITH A DIFFERENT CAUSAL STREAM.

CONCLUSION: YES, THIS IDENTITY MODEL BELONGS TO THE DIFFERENCES-OCCUR CATEGORY.

DISCONTINUOUS PHYSICAL CAUSALITY IDENTITY DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY

DOES STASIS DURING THE SCAN BREAK THE ANCESTOR'S OWN PHYSICAL CONTINUITY, RENDERING THAT DESCENDANT JUST AS DISCONNECTED FROM THE ANCESTOR AS THE "UPLOAD"?

NO. WE KNOW THIS FROM REAL-LIFE CASES OF DEEP STASIS, SUCH AS DEEP HYPOTHERMIC CIRCULATORY ARREST AND RAPID FRIGID DROWNING.

ONE DESCENDANT TRULY DOES MAINTAIN GREATER PHYSICAL CAUSALITY WITH THE ANCESTOR THAN OTHER DESCENDANTS.

SOME PEOPLE QUICKLY POINT TO THIS PHYSICAL CAUSAL CHAIN AS THE CRITICAL DIFFERENCE IN JUDGING UPLOADING, BUT THAT'S THE POINT OF HAVING A MENU OF IDENTITY MODELS. PERHAPS PHYSICAL CAUSALITY ISN'T THE BEST MODEL OF ABSTRACT METAPHYSICAL PERSONAL IDENTITY IN THE FIRST PLACE.

FUNCTIONAL OR BEHAVIORAL IDENTITY DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY

QUESTION: DOES FUNCTIONAL CONTINUITY REQUIRE AN ONLINE UPLOADING PROCESS, OR IS PAUSING THE ANCESTOR'S NEURAL FUNCTIONS (STASIS) AND RESUMING THEM AFTER UPLOADING STILL "FUNCTIONALLY CONTINUOUS"?

IT SHOULDN'T MATTER IF WE ARE INQUIRING ABOUT A BODY-SAME OR BODY-NEW DESCENDANT, SINCE THAT CONFLATES FUNCTIONAL IDENTITY WITH OTHER MODELS (BODY, PHYSICAL CAUSALITY, ETC.).

SINCE "FUNCTIONS" ARE ABSTRACT, NOT PHYSICAL, I WILL ASSUME THEY ARE IMMUNE TO CONCERNS OVER "SMOOTH TEMPORAL EMBEDDING" AND REMAIN CONTINUOUS WITHIN THIS MODEL, EVEN IF THE UNDERLYING PHYSICAL PROCESSES UNDERGO STASIS*.

*IF A MATHEMATICIAN GRINDS THROUGH A COMPLEX FUNCTION WITH PENCIL AND PAPER, PAUSES PART WAY THROUGH, PERHAPS FOR MANY YEARS, AND THEN RESUMES AND COMPLETES THE WORK AT A LATER TIME, DO WE CONSIDER THE LATER WORK TO BE "FINISHING THE SAME CALCULATION" FROM BEFORE? I THINK SO.

FUNCTIONAL OR BEHAVIORAL IDENTITY DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY

ANY DESCENDANT WHOSE NEUROLOGICAL PATTERNS CONTINUE OR RESUME THE SPIKE-GENERATING/PROPAGATING OR INFORMATION-PROCESSING STATISTICS OF THE ANCESTOR HAS SATISFIED THIS IDENTITY MODEL'S CRITERIA.

SO, ALL DESCENDANTS ARE EQUALLY FUNCTIONALLY CONTINUOUS WITH THE ANCESTOR AND NO DIFFERENCES CAN OCCUR WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE MODEL.

CONCLUSION: NO, THIS WOULD EXCLUDE FUNCTION OR BEHAVIORAL IDENTITY FROM THE DIFFERENCES-OCCUR CATEGORY.

PATTERN IDENTITY DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY

ASSUMING THE PATTERN IN QUESTION IS THE BRAIN MORPHOLOGY, CONNECTOMIC CIRCUITRY, OR ASSOCIATED COGNITIVE TRAITS OF THE ANCESTOR, THEN SUCCESSFUL UPLOADING IMPLIES THAT ALL DESCENDANTS COMMENCE POST-PROCEDURE WITH IDENTICAL INSTANTIATIONS OF THE PATTERN.

THEIR PATTERNS THEN DIVERGE, BUT AT THE MOMENT OF UPLOAD-PROCESS COMPLETION, THEIR PATTERNS ARE DEFINITELY IDENTICAL. THAT'S THE MODEL.

CONCLUSION: NO, THIS IDENTITY MODEL DOES NOT BELONG TO THE DIFFERENCES-OCCUR CATEGORY.

STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS IDENTITY DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY

A STASIS PROCEDURE BREAKS THE STREAM BEFORE THE BRANCH POINT. THE DIFFERENCE QUESTION APPLIES BEFORE DIVERGENCE, SO AT THE INSTANT THE DESCENDANTS AWAKEN, BEFORE THEY DIVERGE, THEIR STREAMS OF CONSCIOUSNESS INITIATE FROM IDENTICAL STATES.

HOWEVER, A WAKING PROCEDURE COULD GENERATE DIFFERING STREAMS. ONE DESCENDANT MIGHT EXPERIENCE A VISUALLY SMOOTH LOCATION AND NO BODY CHANGE (E.G., SYNONYMOUS WITH THE ANCESTOR, COLLOQUIALLY THE "ORIGINAL PERSON") WHILE ANOTHER DESCENDANT EXPERIENCES SOME SORT OF SHIFT IN BODY AND LOCATION (A SLOW SHIFT WOULD FEEL LIKE "PHASING" (?!) WHILE A FAST SHIFT WOULD FEEL LIKE TELEPORTATION AND/OR "BODY-SWAPPING" PERHAPS (?!)).

STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS IDENTITY* DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY

SO, UPLOADING DOESN'T HAVE TO YIELD DIFFERENCES IN THE CONSCIOUS STREAMS BETWEEN THE DESCENDANTS, BUT IT IS POSSIBLE TO DO SO, DEPENDING ON THE STASIS STATUS OF THE PROCEDURE.

CONCLUSION: NO, FOR A STASIS PROCEDURE, DESCENDANTS CANNOT EXPERIENCE THE UPLOADING PROCESS ITSELF DIFFERENTLY. BUT YES, FOR A WAKING PROCEDURE, DESCENDANTS CAN DIFFER IN THEIR DIACHRONIC EXPERIENCE OF THE UPLOADING PROCESS.

*BARRY DANTON, STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS (2000) AND THE PHENOMENAL SELF (2008). DANTON EXTENDS THIS MODEL TO THE "POTENTIAL" FOR STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS CONTINUITY TO BRIDGE SLEEP AND RELATED BREAKS IN THE STREAM).

STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS IDENTITY DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY

CONCLUSION: YES, DESCENDANTS CAN DIFFER IN THEIR DIACHRONIC EXPERIENCE OF THE UPLOADING PROCESS ITSELF.

REMEMBER, THE POINT AT THIS STAGE OF CONSIDERATION IS NOT TO RENDER JUDGMENT OF THE IDENTITY STATUS OF DESCENDANTS. MEMBERSHIP IN THE DIFFERENCES-OCCUR CATEGORY DOESN'T IMPLY THAT CERTAIN DESCENDANTS OF MIND UPLOADING ARE NECESSARILY COPIES. ON ANALYSIS, WE MIGHT STILL CONCLUDE THAT STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS IDENTITY YIELDS EQUAL BRANCHES WITH NO IDENTITY PRIMACY WINNER*.


BUT THIS IDENTITY MODEL IS A VALID CANDIDATE FOR SUCH DIFFERENCE ANALYSIS, UNLIKE SOME OTHER MODELS.

*WILEY, THE STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND PERSONAL IDENTITY (2019), NONDESTRUCTIVE MIND UPLOADING AND THE STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS (2023).

PSYCHOLOGICAL IDENTITY DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY

WHICH BRINGS US TO PSYCHOLOGICAL IDENTITY.

THIS IS EASIER TO ANALYZE FOR A SCENARIO INVOLVING STASIS BECAUSE THE ANCESTRAL MEMORY HISTORY "RECORDS" LOSING CONSCIOUSNESS PRIOR TO THE PROCEDURE. SO LET'S START THERE.



WELL, THERE ARE NO SUBSEQUENT MEMORIES AFTER ENTERING STASIS (BEFORE THE PROCEDURE HAS EVEN BEGUN) AVAILABLE FOR DESCENDANT SCRUTINY OR DIFFERENCE CONSIDERATION.

AWAKENING CONSTITUTES DIVERGENCE, NOT ANCESTRAL RELATION.

PSYCHOLOGICAL IDENTITY DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY

IN FACT, WE CAN JUDGE AND LABEL THE DESCENDANTS' RESPECTIVE IDENTITY STATUSES **BEFORE** WE AWAKEN THEM, AT WHICH POINT NO SUCH REVIVAL MEMORY STREAMS HAVE COMMENCED.

THIS FEASIBILITY OF JUDGING BEFORE REVIVAL ESTABLISHES THE IRRELEVANCE OF SUCH POST-PROCEDURE MEMORIES.

THEREFORE, IN A STASIS SCENARIO, THERE CLEARLY IS NO DIFFERENCE IN THE DESCENDANTS' ENCODED MEMORIES OF THE ANCESTOR, I.E., PRIOR TO—OR DURING—THE PROCEDURE.

THEREFORE...

PSYCHOLOGICAL IDENTITY DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY

CONCLUSION: NO, IN A STASIS SCENARIO, PSYCHOLOGICAL IDENTITY DOESN'T BELONG TO THE DIFFERENCES-OCCUR CATEGORY.

I HATE TO DO THIS, BUT IN THE INTERESTS OF TIME, I MUST SKIP AN ANALYSIS OF A NON-STASIS SCENARIO. HOWEVER, THE FULL SLIDES COVER IT, AS I HAVE ALSO PRESENTED ELSEWHERE*.

*WILEY, THE STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND PERSONAL IDENTITY (2019), NONDESTRUCTIVE MIND UPLOADING AND THE STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS (2023).

PSYCHOLOGICAL IDENTITY DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY

WHAT ABOUT A NON-STASIS SCENARIO?

ONE DESCENDANT MIGHT REMEMBER A SMOOTH LOCATION (OR A COMPLETE LACK OF RELOCATION) WHILE ANOTHER REMEMBERS TELEPORTION. THESE MEMORIES PERTAIN TO THE UPLOAD PROCESS ITSELF, NOT DIVERGENT EXPERIENCES AFTERWARDS.

THIS ISN'T A CONSIDERATION OF THEIR CONSCIOUS STREAMS OF THE UPLOADING PROCESS, ALTHOUGH THE TWO SEEM HELPLESSLY CONNECTED. THAT'S HANDLED BY A DIFFERENT MODEL.

ARE WE CERTAIN THOSE DIFFERING MEMORIES BY THE DESCENDANTS SHOULDN'T AFFECT PSYCHOLOGICAL IDENTITY'S DIFFERENCES-OCCUR CATEGORY MEMBERSHIP?

LET'S SEE...

PSYCHOLOGICAL IDENTITY DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY

SHOULD EXPERIENCING (OR REMEMBERING) A SMOOTH UPLOADING PROCESS AS OPPOSED TO A DISCONTINUOUS PROCESS GRANT IDENTITY PRIMACY (TO THE SMOOTHER EXPERIENCE)*?

THREE SCENARIOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR IDENTITY PRESERVATION:

- **BEING MOVED WHILE ASLEEP**
 - IF YOU AWAKEN IN A NEW LOCATION, WE DON'T DEEM YOUR IDENTITY DESTROYED OR NEWLY INVOKED.
- **BEING MOVED WHILE ASLEEP TO AN IDENTICAL-APPEARING LOCATION**
 - IF YOU FALL ASLEEP IN A MINIMAL ENVIRONMENT AND AWAKEN IN A DIFFERENT, INDISTINGUISHABLE ENVIRONMENT, WE DON'T CONSIDER THAT ERROR IN SITUATIONAL COMPREHENSION RELEVANT TO YOUR IDENTITY.
- **DONNING VR GOGGLES OR TELEPORTING WITHIN VR BETWEEN VIRTUAL LOCATIONS**
 - IF YOU VISUALLY EXPERIENCE TELEPORTATION (REGARDLESS OF ACTUAL PHYSICAL TELEPORTATION) WE DON'T DEEM YOUR IDENTITY AFFECTED.

*WILEY, THE STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND PERSONAL IDENTITY (2019), NONDESTRUCTIVE MIND UPLOADING AND THE STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS (2023).

PSYCHOLOGICAL IDENTITY DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY

SHOULD EXPERIENCING (OR REMEMBERING) A SMOOTH UPLOADING PROCESS AS OPPOSED TO A DISCONTINUOUS PROCESS GRANT IDENTITY PRIMACY (TO THE SMOOTHER EXPERIENCE)?

THREE SCENARIOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR IDENTITY PRESERVATION:

- **BEING MOVED WHILE ASLEEP**
 - IF YOU AWAKEN IN A NEW LOCATION, WE DON'T DEEM YOUR IDENTITY DESTROYED OR NEWLY INVOKED.
 - **IDENTITY PRESERVATION DOESN'T DEPEND ON SMOOTH VISUAL OR LOCATIONAL EXPERIENCE ACROSS CONSCIOUS BREAKS (SLEEP).**
- **BEING MOVED WHILE ASLEEP TO AN IDENTICAL-APPEARING LOCATION**
 - IF YOU FALL ASLEEP IN A MINIMAL ENVIRONMENT AND AWAKEN IN A DIFFERENT, INDISTINGUISHABLE ENVIRONMENT, WE DON'T CONSIDER THAT ERROR IN SITUATIONAL COMPREHENSION RELEVANT TO YOUR IDENTITY.
 - **IDENTITY PRESERVATION DOESN'T DEPEND ON ACCURATELY COMPREHENDING YOUR LOCATIONAL CONTINUITY OR LACK THEREOF.**
- **DONNING VR GOGGLES OR TELEPORTING WITHIN VR BETWEEN VIRTUAL LOCATIONS**
 - IF YOU VISUALLY EXPERIENCE TELEPORTATION (REGARDLESS OF ACTUAL PHYSICAL TELEPORTATION) WE DON'T DEEM YOUR IDENTITY AFFECTED.
 - **IDENTITY PRESERVATION DOESN'T EVEN DEPEND ON SMOOTH VISUAL OR LOCATIONAL EXPERIENCE WHILE FULLY CONSCIOUS.**

PSYCHOLOGICAL IDENTITY DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY

IF A SMOOTH VISUAL EXPERIENCE IS PROVEN TO BE IRRELEVANT TO IDENTITY PRESERVATION, THEN DIFFERING MEMORIES IN THAT REGARD DON'T REPRESENT AN APPLICABLE DIFFERENCE FOR DETERMINING IDENTITY PRESERVATION OR ANCESTOR PRIMACY. THEY ARE A DIFFERENCE, BUT THEY DON'T APPEAR TO BE A DIFFERENCE THAT CARRIES IDENTITY-STATUS-DETERMINING POWER.

CONCLUSION: YES, SINCE A NON-STASIS SCENARIO WOULD SEEM TO ENABLE DIFFERING DESCENDANT MEMORIES OF LOCATION CONTINUITY DURING (AND AS A DIRECT RESULT OF) THE UPLOADING PROCESS, PSYCHOLOGICAL IDENTITY APPEARS TO BELONG IN THE DIFFERENCES-OCCUR CATEGORY FOR A NON-STASIS SCENARIO—BUT THE SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS APPEARS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT COPYISM CAN'T BE CONCLUDED FROM THOSE DIFFERENCES ANYWAY.

DIFFERENCES-OCCUR CATEGORY ASSIGNMENT SUMMARY

- BODY IDENTITY'S CLAIMS ABOUT ATOM PRIORITY INDICATE DIFFERENCES AT THE MOMENT OF UPLOAD PROCEDURE COMPLETION THAT ARE AT LEAST CANDIDATES FOR RELEVANCE: 
- 4D SPACETIME WORM IDENTITY USUALLY, WITH THE EXCEPTIONAL CASE OF PERFECT FISSION, YIELDS DESCENDANT DIFFERENCES AT LEAST WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION REGARDING IDENTITY STATUS: 
- CLOSEST CONTINUER IDENTITY DIRECTLY IMPLIES DIFFERENCES: 
- STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IDENTITY CAN'T RESULT IN DESCENDANT DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE MODELS, PROVIDED THE PROCEDURE OCCURS UNDER STASIS, BUT THEY CAN IF THE PROCEDURE IS CONSCIOUS:

			
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- PHYSICALLY CAUSAL, FUNCTIONAL, AND PATTERN IDENTITY CAN'T IMPOSE MEANINGFUL DIFFERENCES:   

PERSONAL IDENTITY MODEL DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY

WHICH IDENTITY MODELS ARE CANDIDATES FOR DIFFERENCES TO OCCUR BETWEEN DESCENDANTS? NOW WE CAN FILL THIS TABLE IN.

IDENTITY MODEL	DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY	SPECIAL CASE
BODY	YES	
4D SPACETIME WORM	YES	50% FISSION: No
CLOSEST CONTINUER	YES	50% FISSION: MODEL DOESN'T APPLY
PHYSICAL CAUSALITY	No	
FUNCTIONAL OR BEHAVIORAL	No	
PATTERN	No	
STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS	No (STASIS PROCEDURE)	CONSCIOUS PROCEDURE: YES*
PSYCHOLOGICAL	No (STASIS PROCEDURE)	CONSCIOUS PROCEDURE: YES†

MODELS FOR WHICH DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY IS OFF THE TABLE INDICATE CATEGORY ERROR HAZARDS. PHILOSOPHIZE AT YOUR OWN RISK. THERE BE LOGIC DRAGONS HERE.



*I HAVE WRITTEN EXTENSIVELY ON THE VALIDITY—OR LACK THEREOF—OF STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS IDENTITY:
WILEY, K. THE STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND PERSONAL IDENTITY (2019).
WILEY, K. NONDESTRUCTIVE MIND UPLOADING AND THE STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS (2023).
†HOWEVER, EARLIER SLIDES SHOWED THAT ANALYSIS OF THESE DIFFERENCES, WHILE NOT A CATEGORY ERROR, DOESN'T APPEAR TO REVEAL IDENTITY ASSYMETRIES.

IDENTITY DIFFERENCE CANDIDACY INTERPRETATION

THE MERE FACT THAT A MODEL BELONGS IN THE DIFFERENCES-OCCUR CATEGORY DOESN'T MEAN THAT IDENTITY PRIMACY IS NECESSARILY ASSYMETRICAL, I.E., THAT COPYISM OCCURS.

IT'S STILL POSSIBLE THAT ANALYSIS WOULD REVEAL VALID IDENTITY BRANCHING WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE MODEL.

CATEGORY MEMBERSHIP SIMPLY MEANS THAT ANALYSIS OF DESCENDANT DIFFERENCES RELATIVE TO THE ANCESTOR, OR IMPLICATIONS FOR IDENTITY PRIMACY, ISN'T INHERENTLY ERRONEOUS*.

HOWEVER, FOR THOSE MODELS THAT DON'T BELONG TO THE DIFFERENCES-OCCUR CATEGORY, TO EVEN BROACH THE QUESTION OF DIFFERING IDENTITY PRIMACY IS TO COMMIT A CATEGORY ERROR.

*SEE FOOTNOTES ON PREVIOUS SLIDE.

CONCLUSION

I PREFER BRANCHING PSYCHOLOGICAL IDENTITY...

BECAUSE, FOR ME, HONORING FIRST PERSON PERSPECTIVES IS AMONG THE PARAMOUNT CRITERIA WHEN SELECTING AN IDENTITY MODEL. OTHER MODELS ARE MORE RELIANT ON THIRD PERSON CRITERIA AND JUDGMENTS.

CONSEQUENTLY, ANY MENTION OF THE COPY PROBLEM SOUNDS TO ME LIKE A CATEGORY ERROR. THERE SIMPLY IS NO RELEVANT DIFFERENCE BY WHICH TO BRAND "COPYISM".



FIN!

THANK YOU.

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BOOKS

